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Dapo Akande* & Antonios Tzanakopoulos** 
 
In a contribution to the debate regarding the Kampala Amendments on the 
Crime of Aggression, we argued that the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on use of force questions can be relevant in interpreting 
the now-defined international crime that will fall within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).1 This is in part because the crime of 
aggression, as defined in Kampala, requires the commission of an “act of 
aggression” that “by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest 
violation of the United Nations Charter.”2 The fact, however, that the finding 
of a state’s responsibility for such a manifest breach is required for a 
conviction of the crime of aggression raises questions about the involvement 
of the ICC in making determinations of state responsibility.  
The jurisdiction of the ICC extends only to the determination of the 
criminal responsibility of individuals.3 When those individuals are also 
officials or agents of states, questions may also be raised about the 
responsibility of the state to which the acts of the individual are attributable. 
Indeed, where an international crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
committed by a state organ or person whose acts are otherwise attributable to 
the state, there will usually also be a case of state responsibility for breach of 
international law. This is because all the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC reflect the concept of “dual obligations.” That is to say, the prohibitions 
that underlie those “core crimes” are not addressed merely to individuals but 
are also related to the same (or substantially similar) obligations imposed on 
states.4 The prohibition on genocide is addressed both to individuals and to 
states; war crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
which is clearly binding on states; and crimes against humanity are derived 
essentially from human rights law.  
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Although a finding that a state organ has committed an international crime 
for which he or she bears individual criminal responsibility will usually imply 
that the state to which his or her acts are attributable has committed an 
internationally wrongful act that generates state responsibility, it will not 
usually be the role of the ICC to make such a finding of state responsibility. 
Even where the ICC has to make a finding that state organs had a policy of 
committing such crimes or developed a plan to do so,5 these findings would be 
not expressions or determinations of state responsibility but rather a statement 
of facts that would imply the responsibility of the state. 
When it comes to the crime of aggression, however, the definition of the 
crime itself requires the ICC to make a determination of state responsibility as 
a prerequisite for the finding of individual responsibility for the commission of 
the crime. This means that we are not talking here about an implication—even 
a necessary implication—that emerges from the finding that a state organ has 
committed an act of genocide or a crime against humanity. We are actually 
talking about a direct determination of state responsibility as a prerequisite for 
the finding of individual criminal responsibility under international law. As 
Claus Kress has put it, “The crime of aggression  . . . is  . . . the only crime 
under international law that requires the commission of certain internationally 
wrongful conduct by a state.”6 
This required link between state and individual responsibility with respect 
to the crime of aggression suggests that the crime of aggression is different 
from the other “international crimes.” For one thing, it may be argued that the 
project of international criminal justice is about establishing that “crimes 
against international law are committed by men and not by abstract entities,” 
with the emphasis and the focus being laid on the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing individual and that of the state being secondary.7 However, with 
aggression, the focus on the state persists in that the court has first to 
pronounce on state responsibility, and only after it has done that can it proceed 
to determining individual guilt or innocence.  
Furthermore, the required link between state and individual responsibility 
leads to a number of practical questions for the ICC, which we are merely 
highlighting in this brief contribution, along with some provisional responses 
to get the debate going. The first question is whether a state whose leader(s) 
are being prosecuted for the crime of aggression can possibly intervene in ICC 
proceedings in order to argue that no manifest breach of the UN Charter has 
occurred in the particular instance.8 The second, related, question is whether 
the ICC actually has the competence to make an incidental, as it were, finding 
of state responsibility in the context of determining the existence of individual 
criminal responsibility under international law. Any court operating on a 
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limited jurisdictional basis has to determine the extent to which it can make 
the incidental findings that are required in order to answer the main legal 
question falling within its jurisdiction. The ICJ has faced such questions in 
Lockerbie,9 for example, and the issue has also been raised before other courts 
and tribunals, such as those operating under the dispute settlement system of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.10 However, the issue that arises 
with respect to the crime of aggression is whether we are dealing, essentially, 
with a Monetary Gold issue—that is, a situation in which the incidental 
determination required for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction is such as to 
make the claim non-admissible.11 The problem is not that the ICC has to make 
an incidental determination. The issue is that it has to make a determination of 
the responsibility of a state which is not before the Court.  
The appropriateness, under the Monetary Gold principle, of the ICC 
making determinations as to whether states have committed violations of the 
UN Charter, depends essentially on whether the states in question have 
consented to the Court’s engaging in this exercise. Under the ordinary 
jurisdictional regime of the ICC, acts committed by any individual on the 
territory of a state party will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, whether 
that individual is a national of any party to the ICC statute or a national of a 
non-party.12 Consent by the state of nationality is not a requirement for 
jurisdiction.13 However, the possibility that the Court might determine whether 
an act of aggression has been committed by a non-consenting state is lessened 
by the fact that the Kampala amendments on aggression provide that, where 
the jurisdiction of the Court is triggered by a state referral or by the prosecutor 
propio motu, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression when committed by the national of or on the territory of a state that 
is not party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.14 Thus, under this provision, 
findings of state responsibility for acts of aggression may not be made by the 
ICC against states that have not given their consent to ICC jurisdiction.  
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However, the question of ICC findings of state responsibility against 
potentially non-consenting states arises in two other cases. First, there is no 
such exclusion in cases where the jurisdiction of the Court is triggered by a 
Security Council referral.15 Second, the Court’s jurisdiction remains unclear 
with regard to acts of aggression committed by a party to the Rome Statute 
that has neither ratified (or accepted) the Kampala aggression amendments nor 
opted out of them.16 In both of these cases, a determination of state 
responsibility by the ICC could breach the Monetary Gold principle.17 
Although it might be argued (as has been done elsewhere)18 that the first 
scenario relating to Security Council referrals would not be problematic, the 
second scenario would likely offend against the Monetary Gold principle, 
especially in light of the provisions of the Rome Statute dealing with 
amendments.19 
The fact that the ICC will have to determine questions of state 
responsibility in making determinations about individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression thus has implications for how we 
might think about the as yet unclear jurisdiction of the Court over the crime. It 
ought also to have implications for some of the procedures that the Court 
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